

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3 March 1951

Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith,
Director, The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Smith:

For two years, during which I directed the Strategic Intelligence Course at the Air War College, I had occasion to listen to guest lecturers place greater stress on the requirement for better intelligence. As a student in the National War College, I have chosen, as the subject for my term paper, "National Security Requirements for a National Intelligence College". It is in this respect that I have addressed this letter to you, in the hope that the thoughts contained herein may generate some objective thinking along this line.

I reason that one means of improving our intelligence could be to train highly selected individuals in the broader aspects of what we term "national strategic intelligence", similar to what is being done here at the National War College in developing high level policy planners.

Briefly, my ideas fall along these lines:

- a. The National Intelligence College to be on a level with the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. This does not necessarily mean that it should be a military school.
- b. Its place should be in Washington, D. C.
- c. The students - to total 100 or so - to be selected from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and each of the three arms of the military service. The students should be fairly high ranking, say division level or Colonels and Captains (USN).
- d. The course to be of approximately ten (10) months length.
- e. Scope--
 1. An analysis of the various factors comprising national strategic intelligence. Through the process of studying the individual elements of national strength - and their

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inter-relationship - a broad understanding could be achieved on the courses of action that various nations follow in the pursuit of the national objectives.

2. A study of the functions of strategic planning, intelligence planning and their relationship. This would serve purpose in bringing to light, for the edification of the intelligence planner, the requirements for objective intelligence in the creative and speculative fields.
3. An indoctrination in cover and deception planning and its implementation. Similar to 2 above, there must be a definite understanding of the functions of **C** and **D** by those associated with the highest level of intelligence. Further it is not only essential that intelligence understand c and d, it is mandatory that the effects of **C** & **D** on the objective be constantly surveyed for reactions in order that plans can be altered accordingly.
4. An indoctrination in psychological warfare. The importance in this field of warfare is becoming increasingly recognized. The activities along this line by the various agencies of our government have taken a definite and positive step. The functions of intelligence, and intelligence guidance and surveillance, will not only improve our P.W. planning but will also open new and more productive goals - provided it is understood by the individuals who guide intelligence planning and operations in this field.

For your information, I propose to correspond with each of the chiefs of intelligence and with other governmental agencies associated with this type of work. Providing you agree, I would like to use your comments, criticisms or additional remarks as part of the arguments in my term paper.

Sincerely yours,

s/ C. P. LESSIG,
Colonel, USAF
Student, National War College.